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Abstract
In this paper we present a life-cycle model with human capital investment during
working life through training and provide a novel empirical test of human capital theory.
Using a sizable pension reform which shifts the retirement age between two adjacent
cohorts by three years, we document causal evidence that an increase in the working life
increases investment into human capital through training. We estimate this effect using
a regression discontinuity design based on a large sample from the German microcensus.
We discuss and test further predictions regarding the relation between initial schooling,
training, and the reform effect and show that only individuals with a college degree
increase human capital investment. Our results speak to a large class of human capital
models as well as policies extending or shortening working life.
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1 Introduction
Human capital theory starting with Ben-Porath (1967) and Becker (1962) predicts that the
value of human capital investment increases with the payout period of the investment.1 In
this paper, we propose a novel empirical test of this key prediction of the human capital
theory. We exploit an exogenous increase in the working life induced by a sizable pension
reform which changes the payout period of the human capital investment. Our main finding
based on theory and empirical analysis using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) is that
an increase in the working life causally increases human capital investment.
This study presents new evidence that investments, in line with the human capital theory,
respond to changes of the payout period. The policy-induced variation of the pension reform
that we exploit affects the employed in the later part of their working career, i.e. after the
age 50. This period is of central importance for the labor markets and employment policies
since employment rates start to decline during that period. The reform is relevant for large
parts of the working population so our results are informative for macroeconomic human
capital theory as well as theory on pension design.
We proceed in two steps. In the first step, we theoretically discuss the implications of
an increase in the working life on human capital accumulation. The model is based on the
standard life cycle theory of human capital by Ben-Porath (1967) but we allow for human
capital accumulation during the working life through on-the-job training (in the following
training). Moreover, changes in the payout period for human capital investment are not
determined by variation in life expectancy, but by a change in the working life. We derive
three propositions from the model. Proposition I shows that investment in training increases
with working life while according to Proposition II training is increasing with initial education.
Finally, Proposition III determines the conditions when investments in training induced by
an increase in the working life increase with initial schooling.
1This important prediction is the basis to explain the joint increases in life expectancy and educational
investments that have been witnessed in most countries over the past century, see e.g. Soares (2005); Cervellati
and Sunde (2013).
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In the second step, we provide empirical evidence for the propositions of the life-cycle
model. The empirical analysis is based on the data from the German microcensus; the
microcensus is a representative yearly household survey which covers 1% of all German
households (about 370,000 households per year). This data includes detailed information
about specific job-related training which we use to measure post-schooling human capital
investment. In the analysis, we exploit a pension reform to provide causal evidence for the
effect of working life on human capital investment. Specifically, the pension reform abolished
an important early retirement program for women born after 1951. Women born in 1951 and
before could enter retirement at the age of 60 through this pathway. In contrast, for women
born in 1952 and later this pathway has been closed; these women can enter retirement only
at the age of 63. The reform is well suited to estimate the effect of an increase in working
life on training and to test human capital theory. First, Geyer and Welteke (2019) document
a sizable positive employment effect and a causal increase in working life induced by the
pension reform. Second, the pension reform was already implemented in 1999. Thus, the
affected women, i.e. women born in 1952, still had a long remaining working life to benefit
from human capital investment. As a result, we can exploit the variation at the cut-off
between these adjacent cohorts to isolate the causal effect of an increase in working life on
human capital investment on the job.
In the empirical analysis we first use descriptive evidence from the microcensus to pro-
vide empirical support for Proposition I and II: In line with Proposition I, we show that
training positively correlates with remaining working life. Moreover, training also positively
correlates with initial educational levels (Proposition II). We then present causal support for
Propositions I and III. Our empirical results show that the increase in the retirement age has
a sizable effect on human capital accumulation: training increases depending on the specifi-
cation by about 2.5-5 percentage points which corresponds to an increase of 20% - 30% for
these age groups. We carefully examine robustness. Our key finding is robust to the omission
or inclusion of individual-level control variables. Moreover, results are stable to changes in
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the bandwidth for different specifications of the running variable and results do not change
in Donut-RDD specifications that leave out the first or the first two month on each side of
the cutoff. We also test for balancing in individual characteristics and show balance across
the cutoff. Finally, we conduct placebo tests for which we artificially alter the cut-off date
and document null effects of training.
Turning to heterogeneity, we find clear evidence that the training effect is increasing with
initial education. The pension reform increases training for women with a college degree or
more by about 13 percentage points, which corresponds to a relative increase of about 40%.
The effect for women without college degree is not significant.
Our study is related to several strands of the literature. Most important, we contribute to
empirical studies related to the human capital theory which estimate the effect of mortality
on educational outcomes and economic growth, surveyed in e.g. Bloom et al. (2019). Studies
using variation in mortality face at least two challenges. First, as discussed in Hazan (2009)
and Cervellati and Sunde (2013), it is not the change in the length of life pre-se which matters
for investment in human capital, but the survival rates during working life. Second, variation
in life expectancy is rarely random or unexpected, complicating causal estimation. A large
part of the empirical literature uses variation in mortality rates between countries or states,
e.g. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Lorentzen et al. (2008) or Hansen and Strulik (2017), with
mixed findings. Several papers specifically address the methodological challenges focusing on
specific diseases, or on changes in heath services in the context of developing countries.
Oster et al. (2013) use variation in life expectancy driven by Huntington disease realisations
across individuals who have ex-ante similar risks for realisations of this neurological disorder.
They find effects in line with human capital theory on college attendance and completion,
health outcomes, as well as on job training for individuals with different realisations or
information (genetic testing) undertaken between the ages of 17 and 35.2 In developing
countries, Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) use a strong decline in maternal death
2In this study, job training is measured using a variable on whether individuals have ever undertaken job
training for promotion or job advancement since starting their job.
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rates in Sri Lanka and find positive effects on girls’ educational investments measured in
years of school education and literacy rates. In another important study, Baranov and
Kohler (2018) exploit variation in mortality rates related to HIV medication in Malawi to
study effects on savings and on children’s educational investments. They find positive effects
of an increase in life expectancy on both types of outcomes.
Our study is complementary to these studies as it presents evidence that is not related
to variation in life expectancy and focuses on training in the later part of the working career
instead of schooling as the central human capital variable. We use a regression discontinuity
design and variation in working life induced by a pension reform, a common policy parameter
across the developed world. This allows us to study effects of changes in working life on
educational investment for a population that is relatively older and comprises an important
part of the labor force.
The paper is also related to the literature which analyzes the effect of pension reforms
on employment, income, training and mortality. In general, these studies document posi-
tive employment effects and an increase in the working life of pension reforms that reduce
the generosity of the pension system. These studies either exploit exogenous variation in
the pension rules for the identification3 or they are based on structural retirement models4.
Crucially, these studies typically assume an exogenous process of human capital investment
which implies that individuals cannot adjust their human capital investment through addi-
tional training in response of a pension reform. Notable exception are the structural analyses
by Fan et al. (2017) and Blundell et al. (2019). Fan et al. (2017) show that a reduction
in the generosity of the pension system leads to an increase in human capital accumulation
which is not consistent with the assumption of an exogenous human capital process and sim-
ilarly, Blundell et al. (2019) document for women that human capital accumulation through
training has positive effects which partly compensate the negative career effects of children.
3Examples include, Duggan et al. (2007),Mastrobuoni (2009), Staubli and Zweimueller (2013),Atalay and
Barrett (2015),Manoli and Weber (2016),or,Geyer and Welteke (2019).
4See e.g.Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2005), French and Jones (2011)
or Haan and Prowse (2014)
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Several papers also show that a reduction in the generosity of the pension system leads to an
increase in training, e.g. Montizaan et al. (2010), Brunello and Comi (2013) or Bauer and
Eichenberger (2017). However, these papers do not link their findings to a theoretical model
and are based on smaller reforms or specific settings such as workers in large public sector
firms only.5 Finally, there is little empirical evidence that pension reforms have meaningful
effects on life expectancy. Specifically, the literature shows mixed evidence about the effect
of retirement on mortality, but in general the effects are relatively small, in particular for
women. Kuhn et al. (2010) and Fitzpatrick and Moore (2018) document that retirement has
a positive effect on mortality for men but no significant effect on female mortality. Hernaes
et al. (2013) find that the retirement age has no effect on mortality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop a model of human capital
accumulation during the working life. Section 3 describes the German public pension system
and the 1999 pension reform, introduces the data and provides descriptive support for the
predictions of the human capital model. In Section 4, we turn to the causal analysis. We
describe the method and document causal evidence from graphical and regression analyses.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
In this section, we derive a theoretical human capital model and show that individuals, ce-
teris paribus, have an incentive to increase training when working life increases.6 The central
mechanism for this human capital effect is that the returns to training increase with the re-
5The paper is as well related to studies which focus on other dimensions of human capital investment
and training. Several studies discuss the theory of human capital investment through training and provide
empirical evidence about the effect on labor market outcomes in form of wages, job security or employment
probability (see for example Pischke (2001), Zweimueller and Winter-Ebmer (2000), Barrett and O’Connell
(2001), Leuven (2005), Frazis and Loewenstein (2005), Picchio and van Ours (2011), or Ruhose and Weilage
(2019)).
6There exist several reasons why individuals have a a general motivation to invest in training. Most
important, empirical evidence shows that training has a positive effect on wages and on employment, see e.g.
Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) and Blundell et al. (2019). Moreover, training can improve quality of work
and can have positive effects on non-pecuniary outcomes Ruhose and Weilage (2019).
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maining working life of an individual i, denoted by Ri.7 Further, we analyze how the human
capital effect induced by increasing working life differs by initial schooling, Si. To derive
testable predictions by initial schooling, it is necessary to establish first how training, ceteris
paribus, varies with initial schooling endowment. With the assumption that initial schooling
and further human capital accumulation are dynamic complements, see e.g. Cunha and Heck-
mann (2007) and Jacobs (2009), we can show that training increases with initial education.
In the Appendix we show that we can replace this assumption of dynamic complementary
by instead introducing utility costs of training as in Blundell et al. (2019). Finally, we deter-
mine the conditions when investments in training induced by an increase in the working life
increase with initial schooling.
The theoretical model presented below illustrates the mechanism in a simplified and
intuitive setting trough a discrete time model consisting of three stylized periods. Note that
Yti denotes an individual i’s income in period t and Cti denotes the level of consumption in
period t.
1. Period
Each individual derives utility through consumption, U(C1i), with the standard assump-
tion of U ′(C1i) > 0, U ′′(C1i) < 0.
Income in period one is given by:
Y1i = w1(Si)(1− Ii) (1)
Each individual earns wage w1(Si).8 The wage in period one depends on the initial level
7An analogous human capital effect can be generated in a model of firm’s investment decision when the
working life of workers increases. When workers are not perfectly mobile (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999),
the intuition is straight forward in our model: The longer the payout period for the investment of the firm,
i.e. the longer the worker stays in the firm, the higher the investment in human capital. In the data we can
not observe if the training is initiated and financed by the worker or the firm. However, for the empirical
test of the human capital effect this information is not required as we focus on the effect of working life on
training investment and not on the incidence of the human capital investment.
8We assume that individuals are either full time employed or unemployed. Wages of the unemployed are
zero. Thus an increase in the wage can result from entering employment or increase in earnings in full time
employment.
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of schooling which is determined exogenously prior to period one. The wage is increasing
in education, specifically we assume w′1(Si) > 0, w′′1(Si) < 0. In this period the individual
decides on his or her time investment in human capital, Ii, through participation in on-the-job
training measures. Time investment in on-the-job training implies opportunity costs which
in the model are characterized by a fraction of foregone labour income, w1(Si)Ii. Hence,
individuals with high education face higher opportunity costs.
2. Period
Income in period two is given by:
Y2i = w2(Si, Ii)Ri (2)
Ri is the duration of the remaining working life and w2(Si, Ii) is the wage earned in period
two. Individuals in period two collect the returns from their human capital investment made
in period one through their wage, as the wage in period two is a function of training as well
as initial schooling, i.e. w2(Ii, Si). Note that by assumption w2I > 0 and w2I I < 0. Further,
in order to capture the dynamic complementarity between initial schooling, Si and human
capital investment, Ii, we assume w2IS > 0.
3. Period
Period three is the period of retirement. The duration of period three is Ti −Ri, where Ti is
the individual life expectancy. We assume that retirement is a discrete decision to exit the
labor market completely. Income in the retirement period is covered by the state pension
which is a fraction α, with α < 1, of labour income in period two.
Y3 = αw2(Si, Ii)(Ti −Ri) (3)
Utility over all three periods is given by:
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UG = U(C1i) + βU(C2i)Ri + β
2U(C3i)(Ti −Ri)
where β is the discount factors, with β < 1 . The intertemporal budget constraint is:
y1i + βy2i + β
2y3i ≥ C1i + βC2iRi + β2C3i(Ti −Ri)
The maximization problem can hence be depicted by the Lagrangian:
L = UG + λ
[
y1i + βy2i + β
2y3i −
(
C1i + βC2iRi + β
2C3i(Ti −Ri)
)]
(4)
The details of the solutions and the set of First Order Conditions are presented in the
Appendix.
Using comparative statics we derive three main propositions from the human capital
model. Firstly, in Equation 5 we show how the effect of an exogenous increase in the remaining
working life duration (Ri), affects the investment in training (Ii).
∂Ii
∂Ri
=
[αβ − 1]w2I (Si, Ii)
[Ri + (Ti −Ri)αβ]w2I I(Si, Ii) (5)
By assumption w2I > 0 and w2I I < 0. Further, αβ − 1 is negative 9. Therefore the
expression above is positive and we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition I (Working life effect)
The effect of an increase in the working life on training is positive.
Further, we discuss how initial schooling affects the amount of time allocated towards on-
the-job training. The relation between initial schooling and training is captured by Equation
6.10
9This follows from α < 1 and β < 1.
10For a detailed derivation of Equation 6 see Appendix
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∂Ii
∂Si
R 0⇐⇒ w2IS(Si, Ii) Si
w2I(Si, Ii)
R w1S
Si
w1(Si)
(6)
The above shows that as long as the relative return to human capital investment collected
in period two, w2IS(Si, Ii), proportionally out-weighs the opportunity costs, i.e. the return
of schooling received in period one, w1S, human capital investment will increase in schooling,
i.e. ∂Ii
∂Si
> 0.
Proposition II (Initial education effect)
The level of time investment in training rises with initial schooling as long as the additional
returns to human capital investment related to the initial level of schooling are larger than
the opportunity cost of the investment
Finally, in Equation 7 we discuss how the effect of the increase in the working life on
training varies by the initial level of schooling. This effect can be decomposed in two effects.
∂
∂Si
[
∂Ii
∂Ri
]
=
∂I2i
∂Ri∂Si
+
∂I2i
∂Ri∂Ii
∂Ii
∂Si
(7)
The first effect captures the direct effect of how the working life effect, ∂Ii
∂Ri
(Proposition
I), changes with initial schooling and the second effect captures the indirect effect of how the
working life effect is influenced by the existing level of training given the initial schooling
effect ∂Ii
∂Si
(Proposition II). Under the assumption of complementarity between schooling and
training (or alternatively about the utility cost of training, see Appendix) the direct effect
is positive. Therefore, individuals with a higher initial level of schooling have a stronger
incentive to invest in training as a response to an increase in the working life. The indirect
effect, however, is negative as the returns to training are positive but decreasing. Given
an increase in the working life, individuals with higher levels of training, therefore, have a
lower incentive to further increase their training investment. The overall effect ultimately
depends on the two opposing sub-effects, as summarized in Proposition III. In the Appendix
we present a detailed formal derivation of the two opposing effects and their respective signs.
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Proposition III (Working life effect by education)
The reform effect rises with the initial level of schooling, as long as the positive direct effect
outweighs the negative indirect effect.
The remainder of the paper will empirically assess the predictions derived from the theo-
retical model depicted above. First we will present descriptive evidence to provide empirical
support for Propositions I and II. Then, we exploit the variation in the working life induced
by the pension reform to causally test Propositions I and III.
3 Institutional Setting and Data
3.1 Pension reform
Before we turn to the empirical analysis we summarize the relevant aspects about the German
pension system and the 1999 pension reform which induces exogenous variation in the working
life.
The statutory public pension system is the central part of the pension system in Germany.
It covers more than 80% of the workforce with the exceptions of groups that are not subject to
compulsory pension insurance, most important civil servants, and self-employed. It includes
old-age pensions, disability pensions, and survivors benefits. The system is financed by a
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme and has a strong contributory link: pension benefits depend
on the entire working history. The pension system provides several pathways into early
retirement, i.e. claiming retirement benefits before reaching the normal retirement age. In
this analysis we focus on the pension for women which allows drawing benefits starting from
age 60.11
The 1999 reform abolished the pension for women for cohorts born after 1951. Effectively,
the reform raised the early retirement age (ERA) for most women from age 60 to age 63 and
11In addition early retirement is possible via : (1) the invalidity pension; (2) the pension after unemployment
or after old-age part-time work ; (3) the pension for the long-term insured, for more details see Geyer et al.
(2018). For a more general description on the German pension system, see Boersch-Supan and Wilke (2004).
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therefore increased the working life.12 Women born before 1952 could claim the pension for
women if they fulfilled certain qualifying conditions. The eligibility criteria were: (i) at least
15 years of pension insurance contributions; and (ii) at least 10 years of pension insurance
contributions. According to Geyer and Welteke (2019), about 60% of all women born in 1951
were eligible for the old-age pension for women. In our empirical analysis we focus only on
employed women, about 75% of these women fullfill the criteria and are therefore eligibility
for this pathway (see Table 6 below). The pension reform was implemented when affected
women born in 1952 were aged 47. Thus, these women had still a long horizon to benefit
from human capital investments.
Geyer and Welteke (2019) and Geyer et al. (2018) have evaluated the labor market effects
of the pension reform based on administrative data of the public pension insurance accounts
and the Microcensus, respectively. Several findings of these studies are relevant for the
following empirical analysis. Most important the increase in the ERA has a sizable positive
effect on the working life on individuals which is the necessary condition for an increase
in human capital investment. In more detail, employment rates for eligible women aged
between 60 and 62 increase by about 15 percentage points, the combined effect on inactivity
and unemployment has with about 12 percentage points a similar size. Second, Geyer and
Welteke (2019) document that the pension reform has no significant effect on employment,
unemployment, disability or inactivity before the age of 60. This implies, estimation results
on the effect on human capital accumulation for employed women before the age of 60 are
not affected by selection effects into employment induced by the pension reform. Third, there
exists effect heterogeneity by initial education (Geyer et al., 2018). Specifically, employment
effects for women aged 60-62 are larger for high educated women (9.5%) but they are still
sizable and significant for women without high education (8.2%). We will return to this
finding when we discuss heterogeneity in section 4.7.
12The pension after unemployment or after old-age part-time work was abolished at the same time as the
pension for women. However, this does not affect our analysis, as the ERA for this pension type was already
63.
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3.2 The German Microcensus
For the analysis we use the German Microcensus. The Microcensus is an annual, household
based survey with representative information about the population and the labour market
in Germany. Participation in the survey is mandatory. It has a sampling fraction of one
percent of the German population (about 370 000 households) and constitutes the largest
annual household survey in Europe (RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical
Offices of the Laender, 2015).
In the main analysis we concentrate on employed13 women younger than 60 years born
in 1951 and 1952 which we observe during the period 2005 to 2012. For these years the data
include information about the month of birth and consistent information about the partici-
pation of on-the-job training.14 We observe around 1,250 individuals for each birth month in
our sample. Thus, overall, the sample includes information of about 30,000 women born in
the two cohorts of interest. The Microcensus includes important socio-demographic variables,
such as age, education,15 marital status or firm size which we use as control variables.
3.3 On the job training: descriptive evidence
The Microcensus provides in addition information if an employed person has participated
in on-the-job training during the last twelve months. The training information includes
specifically courses that are related to career development, e.g. to improve management,
computer or rhetoric skills.16.
In the following we describe how training participation varies by age and education which
13Women working in "mini-jobs" are not counted as employed.
14Before the year 2005 the Microcensus only provides information about the birth year and the definition of
training changes at several points in time. Therefore, the extension of the sample before 2005 would require
additional assumptions.
15Education is measured with ISCED 2011 levels: based on this information with define women without
college degree or with college degree or more.
16The exact wording of the question reads: Did you in the last 12 months take part in any form of vocational
training? Examples of vocational training are: occupational re-training, courses for career development and
general training courses for example in the fields computing, management, public speaking.
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allows us to provide descriptive evidence for Propositions I and II.17 Figure 1 shows the age
pattern of training for all employed women born between 1940 and 1997. As expected we
find a hump shaped age profile. Training rates are low at very young ages however they
rapidly increase in the first years of the working career. Towards the end of the working
life, i.e., after the age of 50, training strongly decline. Specifically, Figure 1 suggests that
training rates decline between age 53 and 58 by about 10 percentage points. Hence, the
period after the age of 50, which we study in the causal analysis, is particularly sensitive to
changes in the incentives for training. This implies even small changes in the incentives to
invest into training can lead to large responses. In summary, the pattern of Figure 1 provides
first support for Proposition I. Training is reduced when the working horizon, i.e. the payout
period, decreases.
[Figure 1 about here]
In Figure 2 we turn to the training pattern by initial education. In line with Proposition
II we find that training increases with the level of education. Specifically, employed women
born in 1951 with no college degree (ISCED < 5) have training rates of about 15.4 percent.
In contrast women with a college degree or higher tertiary education (ISCED > 5) have
training rates of 31.7 percent.
[Figure 2 about here]
4 Causal Analysis: RDD
4.1 Empirical method
In the empirical analysis we exploit the 1999 pension reform to estimate the effect of an in-
crease in working life on human capital investment and to provide a causal test of Propositions
17For more information on training participation and its measurement in Germany see for example Eiser-
mann et al. (2014).
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I and III using a RDD. The reform leads to an arbitrary and distinct cutoff for women born
before and after December 31, 1951, which determines the assignment into the treatment
and the control group.
More formally, in the empirical analysis the woman’s month of birth is the running variable
M, which determines treatment D as one if she was born after December 31, 1951 an zero
otherwise:
Di =
 1, if Mi ≥ c0, if Mi < c (8)
For the identification of a causal effect it is important that no manipulation of the month
of birth for women born in 1951 and 1952 and no selection into or out-of treatment is possible.
As a result, the treatment and control groups should be otherwise comparable around the
cut-off. We provide supporting evidence based on balancing tests of important pre-policy
covariates of the 1951 and 1952 birth cohorts, and by moving the cutoff to hypothetical
placebo dates. Moreover, as discussed e.g. in Geyer and Welteke (2019) no other relevant
policy reform differently affected women born in 1951 and 1952.
In the main specification we implement the RDD in the following regression model:
yi = α + βDi + γ0f(Mi − c) + γ1Dif(Mi − c) +Xiδ + εit (9)
Di is a dummy specifying treatment, that is equal to 1 if a woman is born 1.1.1952 or later
and 0 otherwise. A woman’s month of birth is described by Mi and c is the cut-off date for
the increase in early retirement age, ERA (January 1, 1952). Therefore, f is a function of the
difference between a woman’s birth date and the beginning of the ERA increase Mi − c, i.e.
the running variable. This function is interacted with the treatment variable Di to allow for
different slopes before and after the cutoff. In addition we account for further explanatory
variables (X ), including age, education, marital status, firm size and regional information.
We implement this specifications using either global polynomials for f up to the third degree,
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as well as local polynomials, and for various bandwidth choices.18
The outcome variable Y in our analysis is on-the-job training which is dichotomous i.e.
taking on the value 1 if a women has participated in training in the last twelve months and
0 if she has not. In the main specification we implement the RDD in a linear probability
model.19
4.2 Graphical analysis
Before turning to the estimation result we provide graphical evidence how an increase in the
working life affects training. In Figure 3, we present the pattern of training for the relevant
cohorts, i.e women born 1951 and 1952, for the ages which we can observe in the data. The
Figure clearly shows that women with a longer working horizon, i.e. women of cohort 1952,
have higher training rates than women born in 1951. As expected, the difference gets smaller
close to age 60, i.e. when both groups have only a short working horizon.
[Figure 3 about here]
In the next Figure we present how training participation varies around the cut-off date.
Specifically, Figure 4 shows participation rates in training by month of birth 12 months
before and after the cut-off birth date, 1.1.1952. The share of employed women participating
in training is clearly higher after the cut-off. The average rate of participation in the 12
month before the cut-off date is approximately 15.4 %. After the cut-off date, the graphs
shows a jump in the average rate of training participation for employed women under 60 to
more than 16.5 percent. In the next section, we examine the robustness and significance of
the the graphical evidence using various choices in the RDD framework.
[Figure 4 about here]
18Local polynomials are estimated using the Stata package "rdrobust" (Calonico et al., 2018).
19Estimation results based of a Probit model (not reported) show very similar results.
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4.3 Regression results - overall effects
To quantify the effect of an increase in the working life on the investment into human capital
we use the RDD described in Section 4.1. In the analysis, we focus on all employed women
in their later working life, i.e. when they are aged between 53 and 60.
In Table 1 we present the estimation results for different specifications with observations
12 months before and after the cut-off date. We consider regressions with global polynomials,
with linear, quadratic and cubic specifications and local linear and local quadratic specifi-
cations. Moreover, the table includes these regressions without and with additional control
variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at the birth month level.
Our inference is robust to a specification without clustered standard errors as suggested by
Kolesar and Rothe (2018).
[Table 1 about here]
The results of these different specifications all point in the same direction despite some
expected differences in the magnitude of the point estimates: the increase in the early re-
tirement age has a positive and significant effect on the investment in training. Most point
estimates show that the participation in training increases between 2.5-5 percentage points,
which translates into a relative increase of about 20-30% given the pre-reform share in training
of 15.4%.
Only the global linear specification in the top panel (without covariates) in column 1
is not statistically significant, albeit positive. However, this is the least flexible version of
conditioning on the running variable and therefore -a priori- not the preferred specification.
In contrast, the local linear regressions in Columns 4 to 5 of Table 1 consistently show positive
and significant estimates in similar magnitude across all specifications.
4.4 Balancing tests
[Table 2 about here]
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The assumption that underlies the RD design is that other factors vary smoothly across
the cutoff. We provide support for this assumption by using individual control variables as
outcomes using the same specification as in Table 1. The resulting estimates are presented in
Table 2. All control variables, except the share of women with high income, are insignificant
at conventional levels of statistical significance. Yet, the income variable is significant only
at the 10% level of statistical significance. The balancing in these variables is also reflected
in the fact that adding the controls to our main specification hardly affects the estimates for
the training outcome, as already seen in Table 1.
4.5 Placebo analysis
[Table 3 about here]
In addition, we conduct two placebo analyses presented in Table 3. In the first placebo
analysis we artificially shift the cut-off date by one year to 1.1.1950 and in the second placebo
analysis to 1.1.1952. Importantly, the pension rules are identical before and after the cho-
sen placebo cut-offs. The shift of one entire year is of particular relevance as this could
capture potential seasonal effects related to the December to January timing of the reform
introduction.
The result from this additional analysis support our identification strategy: the treatment
effect is very close to zero and not significant in both placebo specifications, with and without
additional explanatory variables. Moreover, these effects are precisely estimated clearly differ
from our main findings in Table 1.
4.6 Further robustness checks: bandwidth and donut regressions
Bandwidth choices can affect RD estimates so we carefully examine if and how our main
results are sensitive to these. First, in Appendix Table A.1 we replicate our main results
from Table 1 but using a bandwidth of six month rather than a full year on both sides of
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the cutoff, for all specifications of the running variable. Second, in Appendix Table A.2 we
show that our results also hold for additional bandwidth choices for local polynomials, where
we present result for bandwidth choices of 6, 9 and 12 month. The bandwidth of 6 month is
the chosen bandwidth of the endogenous bandwidth selection routine "rdbwselect", using the
mean squared error criterion and a triangular kernel (Calonico et al., 2014). In all cases our
estimates remain in the same ballpark. All estimates except the second column in Appendix
Table A.1, which shows results of the global analysis with a quadratic polynomial, remain
statistically significant at the ten percent level or higher.
As additional robustness check, we also ensure that observations close to the cutoff do
not cause our results. Specifically, we examine if observations close the to cutoff drive our
effects by estimating effects from donut-RD regressions. We estimate different specification
of Equation 9 without one or two birth month closest to the cutoff on both sides. Appendix
Table A.3 shows the resulting estimates for the various functional form choices and without
and with individual control variables. Some of the specifications without covariates loose
statistical significance in the one-month donut, presented in the upper panel. However, overall
this additional analysis confirms the main findings, with estimates of similar magnitudes
throughout. Our results are not driven by observations close to the cutoff.
4.7 Effects by initial education
We now extend the empirical analysis and focus on effect heterogeneity along prior edu-
cational levels. We have already shown descriptively that training participation positively
correlates with prior educational levels in Section 3.3 (Proposition II). We now move on to
test if the reform effect also varies by prior educational level (Proposition III). Since we only
focus on women close to the cut-off, to alleviate issues of sample size we aggregate the ISCED
educational levels into two education groups of women with "college" and "non-college".
[Table 4 about here]
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We find very strong differences by education for the different specifications presented in
Table 4. Women with college education or more increase training by nearly 12 percentage
points which corresponds to a relative increase of about 35%. The effect for women without
college education is estimated to be close to zero and not significant at conventional levels.
We therefore conclude that the direct training effects outweighs the negative indirect effect
(Proposition III), which explains why the human capital induced by an increase in working
life increase with education.
4.8 Quantification of effects
As discussed in Section 3.1, the 1999 pension reform only affected the working life of women
which fulfill the eligibility criteria for the so-called pension for women. The Microcensus,
which we base our analysis on, is a cross sectional data set without information about the
employment history. Therefore, we can not directly determine the eligibility within this data.
As a result, our estimates should be interpreted as "intention-to-treat" (ITT) effects, giving
a lower bound of the true effect.
To gauge information about actual eligibility, we use information from the longitudinal
data of the Socio-economics panel (SOEP), the largest household panel data set available in
Germany. In the representative SOEP data, about 76% of women employed before entering
retirement were indeed eligible for this pathway into retirement. Further, the SOEP data
show that about 72% of employment women without a college degree and 85% of women
with a college degree fulfill the eligibility criteria..
With this information and the estimated effects (ITT) presented in Tables 1 and 4, we
can derive the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for the different educational
groups. These are presented in Table 5. Overall, the pattern of the ATT effects is similar
to the ITT effects, but the effects are slightly larger. Importantly, the ATT effects provide
as well empirical support for Propositions I and III derived from the human capital model.
The point estimates suggest that overall women training increases by 4.6 percentage points
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(column 1), for women with college the increase is over 13 percentage points (column 2) and
the effect for women without college is close to zero (column 3). The point estimates imply
a relative increase in training of 30% of all women and 40% of women with college degree.
[Table 5 about here]
Overall, the magnitude of the estimated ITT and ATT effects are consistent with the
strongly declining pattern of training after the age of 50, presented in Figure 1. As discussed
above, training participation is particularly sensitive to changes in ages close to retirement
which determine the remaining working life. Therefore, it is not surprising that an increase
in the working life induced by the increase in retirement age from 60 to 63 has sizable effects
on training.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide causal evidence for the theory of human capital accumulation. In
the empirical analysis we use an exogenous change in the working life which increases the
payout period for the human capital investment. Specifically we exploit a sizable pension
reform which increased the early retirement age for women between two adjacent cohorts
from 60 to 63 years. The analysis is based on the German Microcensus and exploits in a
RDD the cohort specific variation of the pension reform.
The empirical analysis offers support for three key propositions of the human capital
model which are derived in the first part of the paper. First we provide descriptive evidence
that training positively correlates with remaining working life and with initial educational
levels. We then present causal evidence that an increase in working life induced by the pension
reform has a positive effect on human capital investment and that this human capital effect
increases with initial schooling. In more detail, our empirical results show that the increase
in the retirement age has a sizable effect on human capital accumulation of employed women
aged 63-60: depending on the specification training increases by about 2.5-5 percentage
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points which corresponds to an increase of 20-30% for these age groups. This finding is
robust to changes in the bandwidth and for different specifications of the running variable
in the RDD and is supported by placebo test. Moreover, we show that the pension reform
increases training for women with a college degree or more by 11 percentage points, which
corresponds to a relative increase of about 35%. The effect for women without college degree
is not significant.
Besides testing a key prediction of human capital theory for a large and relevant part of
the working population, our results have important implications for the policy debate about
pension reforms. This debate usually abstracts from the dynamic human capital investment
that we document. Future work should examine the role of individual workers and firms
in initiating the positive training effects that we document, adding to the still relatively
underdeveloped literature on educational investments beyond initial schooling.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Average on-the-job training participation by age, Cohorts: 1940-1997
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Figure 2: Average on-the-job training participation by ISCED groups
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Figure 3: Average on-the-job training participation for sample group
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Figure 4: On the job training around the cut-off date
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Notes: The fitted lines are local linear regressions using a first degree polynomial, a
triangular kernel. In total, information for 13,658 individuals below the threshold and
14,873 individuals above the threshold are used.
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Table 1: Regression Discontinuity: Main Results
Global Polynomial Local Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0157 0.0352*** 0.0502*** 0.0235** 0.0418***
(0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0105) (0.012) (0.0131)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0150* 0.0358*** 0.0439*** 0.0252*** 0.0413***
(0.0082) (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0087) (0.0097)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses; clustered at birth month level. Sample includes twelve month before
and after reform cutoff. Significance levels: ∗ p 0.10, ∗∗ p 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p 0.01; Pre-Policy Mean: 15.41 percent.
Source: Microcensus 2005-2012, own calculations.
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Table 2: Balancing
Global Polynomial Local Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
College Education
Treatment Variable -0.0010 0.0087 0.0324 0.0029 0.0191
(0.0175) (0.0300) (0.0322) (0.0230) (0.0307)
High Household Income
Treatment Variable -0.0168 -0.0295* 0.0040 -0.0220* -0.0149
(0.0108) (0.0142) (0.0168) (0.0122) (0.0186)
West
Treatment Variable 0.0156 0.0056 -0.0097 0.01162 -0.0010
(0.0192) (0.0297) (0.0415) (0.0233) (0.0326)
Big Company
Treatment Variable -0.0061 -0.0129 0.0221 -0.00900 0.0023
(0.0096) (0.0121) (0.0213) (0.0080) (0.0104)
Single
Treatment Variable -0.0093 -0.0083 -0.0006 -0.0089* -0.0050
(0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0089) (0.0051) (0.0063)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Sample includes twelve month before and after reform cutoff.
Significance levels: ∗ p 0.10, ∗∗ p 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p 0.01;
Source: Microcensus 2005-2012, own calculations.
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Table 3: Placebo Regression Discontinuity Designs
Global Polynomial Local Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Placebo 1950/51
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0056 0.0098 -0.0031 0.0017 0.0055
(0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0235) (0.0102) (0.0153)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0102 0.0138 0.0003 0.0063 0.0069
(0.0155) (0.0166) (0.0249) (0.0100) (0.0151)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
Placebo 1952/53
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable -0.0060 -0.0067 -0.0072 0.0001 0.0004
(0.0088) (0.0081) (0.0119) (0.0101) (0.0128)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable -0.0041 -0.0048 -0.0084 -0.0001 0.0039
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0109) (0.0088) (0.0112)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Sample includes twelve month before and after reform cutoff.
Significance levels: ∗ p 0.10, ∗∗ p 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p 0.01; Pre-Policy Mean: 15.41 percent.
Source: Microcensus 2005-2012, own calculations.
30
Table 4: Heterogeneity by educational level
Global Polynomial Local Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-College
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0064 0.0117 0.0213 0.0085 0.0158
(0.0091) (0.0131) (0.0174) (0.0095) (0.0133)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0065 0.0133 0.0227 0.0093 0.0175
(0.0096) (0.0138) (0.0175) (0.0103) (0.0139)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
College
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0557 0.1285*** 0.1505*** 0.0844** 0.1383***
(0.0346) (0.0373) (0.0486) (0.0354) (0.0392)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0573* 0.1291*** 0.1409*** 0.0851*** 0.1325***
(0.0328) (0.0350) (0.0458) (0.0330) (0.0375)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Sample includes twelve month before and after reform cutoff.
Significance levels: ∗ p 0.10, ∗∗ p 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p 0.01; Pre-Policy Mean: 15.41 percent.
Source: Microcensus 2005-2012, own calculations.
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Table 5: Average Treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
All College Non-College
(1) (2) (3)
Global Polynomial
Linear
ATT 0.0197 0.0682 0.090
Relative Size ATT (in%) 12.82 21.52 7.16
Quadratic
ATT 0.047 0.1536 0.0185
Relative Size ATT (in%) 30.59 48.48 15.79
Cubic
ATT 0.0578 0.1677 0.0315
Relative Size ATT (in%) 37.50 52.91 26.95
Local Polynomial
Linear
ATT 0.0332 0.1013 0.0129
Relative Size ATT (in%) 21.53 31.19 11.03
Quadratic
ATT 0.0543 0.1577 0.0242
Relative Size ATT (in%) 35.30 49.76 20.66
Observations 28,531 5,469 22,694
Eligibility (in%) 76 84 72
Notes: The ATT is derived by weighting the ITT effects presented in Tables 1 and 4 using the specification
including covariates with the share of employed women eligible for the pension or women. The eligibility
rates are calculate from the SOEP data. For the ITT estimates we choose the specification equivalent to
column 2 in Table 2, with a global quadratic running variable and with control variables. The sample
includes twelve month pre and post reform. Participation rates in training before the reform are 0.154,
0.317, 0.117 for all employed women, employed women with college and employed women without college,
respectively.
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Appendix Figures and Tables
Table A.1: Regression Discontinuity: Bandwith 6 months
Global Polynomial Local Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0329** 0.0273 0.0945*** 0.0307** 0.0559***
(0.0131) (0.0142) (0.0204) (0.0130) (0.0168)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0349*** 0.0243 0.0679*** 0.0305*** 0.0428***
(0.0108) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0118)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses; clustered at birth month level. Sample includes six month before
and after reform cutoff. Significance levels: ∗ p 0.10, ∗∗ p 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p 0.01; Pre-Policy Mean: 15.41 percent.
Source: Microcensus 2005-2012, own calculations.
33
Table A.2: Local Polynomial Regression for different Bandwidths
6m 9m 12m 6m 9m 12m
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0307** 0.0307** 0.0235** 0.0559*** 0.0403** 0.0418***
(0.0152) (0.0130) (0.0120) (0.0168) (0.0145) (0.0131)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0305*** 0.0321*** 0.0252*** 0.0428*** 0.0367*** 0.0413***
(0.0108) (0.0094) (0.0087) (0.0118) (0.0106) (0.0100)
Running Variable Linear Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p 0.10, ∗∗ p 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p 0.01;
Source: Microcensus 2005-2012, own calculations.
34
Table A.3: Donut Regression: Leaving out one or two month on each side of cutoff
Global Polynomial Local Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One month donut
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0126* 0.0231** 0.0214 0.0149** 0.0241*
(0.0067) (0.0102) (0.0137) (0.0064) (0.0130)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0142** 0.0307*** 0.0319** 0.0200*** 0.0352***
(0.0061) (0.0076) (0.0109) (0.0051) (0.0103)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
Two month donut
Without Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0172** 0.0307*** 0.0257*** 0.0197*** 0.0407***
(0.0080) (0.0052) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0089)
With Covariates
Treatment Variable 0.0147* 0.0311*** 0.0277*** 0.0191*** 0.0424***
(0.0078) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0072) (0.00652)
Running Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Sample includes twelve month before and after reform cutoff.
Significance levels: ∗ p 0.10, ∗∗ p 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p 0.01.
Source: Microcensus 2005-2012, own calculations.
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Appendix: Theoretical Model
Based on the the theoretical model outlined in section 2 we obtain the following maximization
problem:
UG = U (C1i) + βU(C2i)Ri + β
2U(C3i)(Ti −Ri)
max Ug subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:
y1i + βy2iRi + β
2y3i(Ti −Ri) ≥ C1i + βC2iRi + β2C3i(Ti −Ri)
The Lagrangian is given by:
L = UG + λ
[
y1i + βy2iRi + β
2y3i(Ti −Ri)− (C1i + βC2iRi + β2C3i(Ti −Ri))
]
The set of First Order Conditions i :
∂L
∂C1i
= 0⇒ U ′(C1i)− λ = 0 (A.1)
∂L
∂C2i
= 0⇒ βR(U ′i(C2i)− λ) = 0 (A.2)
∂L
∂C3i
= 0⇒ β(T −R)β2[λ− U(C3i)] = 0 (A.3)
∂L
∂Ii
= 0⇒ λ[−w1(Si) + (Riβ + (Ri − Ti)αβ2)w2I(Si, Ii)] = 0 (A.4)
Based on the set of First Order Conditions we derive our results. Firstly, comparative
statics yield Equation 5 in the main paper, i.e.
∂Ii
∂Ri
=
[αβ − 1]w2I (Si, Ii)
[Ri + (Ti −Ri)αβ]w2II(Si, Ii)
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The reform effect is positive as long as w2I > 0 and w2II < 0. αβ − 1 is negative since
β < 1 and α < 1.
Secondly, Equation 6 in the main paper can be derived as illustrated below. Solving
Equation A.10, i.e. LI ; for β, gives
β =
1
R
(
w1(Si)
w2I(Si, Ii)
+ αβ2(R− T )
)
Taking LIS and substituting in LIS:
sign LIS = sign
[
w2SI(Si, Ii)
w2I(Si, Ii)
− w1I(Si)
w1(Si)
]
The above can then be simplified, written in elasticity form and solved for
∂Ii
∂Si
. This then
ultimately results in Equation 6 in the main paper :
∂Ii
∂Si
R 0⇐⇒ w2IS(Si, Ii) Si
w2I(Si, Ii)
=: ηw2S ,S R ηw1 ,S := w1S
Si
w1(Si)
Lastly, we apply the multivariate chain rule, given that the reform effect is a function of
Ri, Si and Ii, which in itself is a function of si and Ri. Consequently, the size of the reform
effect with respect to schooling can be derived by splitting up the effect into two components:
∂
∂Si
[
∂Ii
∂Ri
]
=
∂I2
∂Ri∂Si
+
∂I2
∂Ri∂Ii
∂I
∂Si
Using comparative statics, it is possible to firstly derive:
∂I2
∂Ri∂Si
=
∂Ii
∂Ri
[
w2SI(Si, Ii)
w2I(Si, Ii)
− w2SII(Si, Ii)
w2II(Si, Ii)
]
The above expression is positive as long as w2SII(Si, Ii) is positive, meaning that the
larger S, the slower is the decline in w2I(Si, Ii) with I.
Secondly, it is possible to derive:
∂I2
∂Ri∂Ii
=
∂Ii
∂Ri
[
w2II(Si, Ii)
w2I(Si, Ii)
− w2III(Si, Ii)
w2II(Si, Ii)
]
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With w2III(Si, Ii) ≤ 0 or sufficiently small the above expression will be negative. Consid-
ering, the expression derived for ∂Ii
∂Si
, we can write:
∂I2
∂Ri∂Ii
∂Ii
∂Si
R 0⇐⇒
[
w1I(Si)
w1(Si)
− w2SI(Si, Ii)
w2I(Si, Ii)
]
Thus assuming that ∂Ii
∂Si
is positive, the reform effect consists of a positive direct and
negative indirect effect and the overall effect depends on the relative size of the respective
effects, as formulated in Proposition III in the main paper.
Appendix: Theoretical Model with Utility Cost
In the following we relax the key assumptions of the model presented in the main text
(Section 2) and show that the propositions hold without the assumption of dynamic com-
plementarities between initial schooling and further human capital accumulation when we
introduce utility costs of training as in Blundell et al. (2019).
1. Period
Income in the first period is given by:
Y1i = w1(Si)
2. Period
Income in period two is given by:
Y2i = w2(Ii)Ri (A.5)
3. Period
Income in period three is given by:
Y3 = αw2(Ii)(Ti −Ri) (A.6)
Utility over all three periods is given by:
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UG = U1i + βU(C2i)Ri + β
2U3i(Ti −Ri)
Where:
U1i = U(C1i)
U2i = U(C2i)− a(Si)Ii
U3i = U(C3i)
Based on the empirical estimates of the structural model in Blundell et al. (2019) we as-
sume that individuals face utility cost of training in period 2, a(Si) which fall with schooling
Si, i.e. a(Si)<0.
Individuals maximize Ug subject to the intertemporal budget constraint which is given by:
y1i + βy2iRi + β
2y3i(Ti −Ri) ≥ C1i + βC2iRi + β2C3i(Ti −Ri)
The Lagrangian hence is:
L = UG + λ
[
y1i + βy2iRi + β
2y3i(Ti −Ri)− (C1i + βC2iRi + β2C3i(Ti −Ri))
]
and the set of First Order Conditions are:
∂L
∂C1i
= 0⇒ U ′(C1i − a(Si)Ii)− λ = 0 (A.7)
∂L
∂C2i
= 0⇒ βR(U ′i(C2i)− λ) = 0 (A.8)
∂L
∂C3i
= 0⇒ β(T −R)β2[λ− U(C3i)] = 0 (A.9)
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∂L
∂Ii
= 0⇒ λ[−a1(Si) + (Riβ + (Ri − Ti)αβ2)w2I(Ii)] = 0. (A.10)
Based on the set of First Order Conditions we derive our results. Firstly, comparative
statics yield Equation A.11 which is equal to Proposition I in the main paper.
∂Ii
∂Ri
=
[αβ − 1]w′2 (Ii)
[Ri + (Ti −Ri)αβ]w′′2(Ii)
(A.11)
As before it holds that the reform effect is positive as long as w′2 > 0 and w′′2 < 0. αβ− 1
is negative since β < 1 and α < 1.
Secondly, the effect of training participation with respect to schooling is captured by
Equation A.12:
∂Ii
∂Si
=
a′(Si)
β[Ri + (Ti −Ri)αβ]w′′2(Ii)
(A.12)
As long as a′(Si) < 0 the effect will be positive.
Lastly, we can derive the effect of schooling on the reform effect. Equation A.13 shows
that the effect is positive as long as w′′′2 (Ii) is positive and w′2(Ii)w′′′2 (Ii) > w′′2(Ii)2.
∂
∂Si
[
∂Ii
∂Ri
]
=
[αβ − 1] a′(Si) [w′′2(Ii)2 − w′2(Ii)w′′′2 (Ii)]
β[Ri + (Ti −Ri)αβ]2w′′2(Ii)2(A.13)
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